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POWER, THEORY BUILDING, AND HEURISTICS 
 
 
 
1. Power as an opportunistic agenda 
 
The way organizations are governed has been a lasting concern for my research agenda as a 
social scientist. To contribute to the advancement of the theory of power, as if it were a kind 
of lifelong concern, has not been of major appeal to me.  
It is true that several if not many of my studies were dealing with manifest or latent power  
centers, and with dominant when not hegemonic social configurations such as the 
headquarters of multinational companies1, or the French administrative, political and 
economic elites called Grands Corps, educated and selected by professional schools such as 
the Ecole Nationale d’Administration and the Ecole Polytechnique2. Whenever some findings 
seemed to be worth being related to agendas about power, I did it. For instance I studied in 
depth how intergovernmental relationships were key to the allocation of political power and 
influence across local and national French polities 3. David Courpasson and I have 
demonstrated how managerial domination regimes inside firms fuel the emergence and 
intensity of rebellion phenomena among their managers4.  
 
Power games and regimes are not discarded. They deserve my attention, as such, or as far as 
they help explain or are related to other dimensions of societal structures and political 
dynamics.  Nevertheless I consider them as marginal concerns, as factors or dimensions not to 
forget about. In other terms I feel like an amateur when I meet and discuss with power experts 
and scholars. My attention and my sense of curiosity are attracted by other topics and 
problems.   
 
The research topics that attract my curiosity combine two dimensions. The first one is that, in 
my opinion, they are related to empirical phenomena and theoretical problems that have been 
neglected or at least poorly explored by social science inquiry. The second one is that, despite 
the fact that Max Weber already had tackled the problem in a such a comprehensive way that 
seemed too leave too much room to further generations of sociologists, I keep wondering how 
logics of action that are different and heterogeneous when not incompatible by their intrinsic 
standards could achieve some degree of compatibility.  In other terms, collective action via 
organizing and organized arrangements is the main focus of my professional curiosity. This is 
why organization theory de facto has structured my agenda for more than forty years in a row. 
One collateral consequence was and still is that I do not separate content from structure, 
process from substance, power dynamics from cognition building and interpretation aspects 
when studying collective action taking. 
 
                                                
1 Michaud C. and J.C. Thoenig. 2003.  Making Strategy and Organization Compatible, Palgrave Macmillan, 
London 
2 Thoenig .J.C. 1987.  L'ère des technocrates, L'Harmattan, Paris 
3 Thoenig J.C. 2005. « Territorial Administration and Political Control. Decentralization in France », Public 
Administration, 83, 3 : 685-708 
4 Courpasson D . and J.C. Thoenig. 2010. When Managers Rebel, Palgrave Macmillan, London  
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Grand theory has never really been my cup of tea. Middle-level theory fits much more my 
expectations about scientific achievement. On one hand I have been attracted by social 
sciences partly because global ideologies were in my opinion based on questionable beliefs in 
terms of relevance and dangerous when used as references for social life and action taking. 
On the other hand elegance and plausibility of models are easier to satisfy.  So I have tried to 
get the best climbing on the shoulders of the giants. My purpose was also not to be cornered 
or blinded by one perspective only for the rest of my scientific life. 
  
I have studied quite different types of organizations - business firms, public agencies, not-for-
profit associations, city halls, the European Commission, etc - from very different angles -
how they function internally as social and human set ups, how they interrelate with third 
parties and society, how they impact the production of public goods and services - and with 
various interpretative perspectives - bureaucracy, technocracy and democracy, policy 
analysis, cognitive theory, development , market and economic exchange, etc. To study an 
organization as a social order structure as well as an action system, I observe how its 
functioning and change is linked more or less to specific missions, decisions or stakes it is 
supposed to be in charge of, alone or with others. I also observe what consequences this 
induces in terms of content of policies and outcomes it is supposed to elaborate and deliver. In 
other terms, I study them under specific circumstances: whenever they are exposed or face a 
problem or a pressure for change from the environment, from outside stakeholders or from 
society at large that may challenge their routines, their missions, their existence.  I have used 
for instance the decentralization reforms of public affairs in France as a revealer of the basic 
characteristics of French public administrations, decentralization as a policy being more a 
means or an opportunity to detect these fundamental organizational properties than an end or 
a topic per se. 
 
Such a trajectory may look like an erratically constructed patchwork, a sum of scattered 
attentions and contributions to quite different specialized domains: public administration, 
elites and social stratification, public policy analysis, cognitive sociology, etc. The fact is that 
I feel at ease and am able to dialogue on equal ground as well with political scientists as with 
sociologists, historians or management scholars.   
 
2. Power as an analytical tool.    
 
While power as a theoretical issue remains of moderate appeal to me, power as an analytical 
tool has persistently and intensively been part of my research tool kit.  
In terms of heuristics, power provides empirical rules or guidelines that are pragmatic, simple 
and fast, and that facilitate fact-finding and context analysis.  It makes complex problems and 
situations more easy to grasp, complexity meaning that too many variables and elements to 
consider would make analysis difficult to start, to handle and to interpret theoretically. More 
precisely, heuristics provides entrance tactics, ways to start an analysis. Being partly based on 
intuition and previous experience of similar situations, it suggests the idea of a proof. It is a 
pre-requisite when complex reasoning patterns are to be handled and explained.   
Power as an analytical tool goes back to the heritage of the neo-behavioral revolution that 
started in Chicago in the 1920s under the influence of Charles Merriam, a political 
sociologist, and his students Herbert Simon and Harold Lasswell. It has been tested and made 
even more instrumental in the 1950 and the 1960s by two major streams in social sciences. 
One, located at the Carnegie Institute of Technology, was mainly studying business firms as 
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organizations, trying to understand how actually they function and make decisions. A 
pioneering contribution to power as a analytical tool was made by James March5. Another 
stream, located in the department of political science of the Yale University and headed by 
Robert Dahl, studied community polities and policy making processes. It gave birth to a 
seminal definition of power, combining behavioral and relational dimensions6. Defining 
power as the capacity of A to get from B a behavior B would never adopt if A would not be 
present or part of the specific situation linking A to B suggested a fruitful analytical agenda. 
Several scholars in the USA and in Europe have developed this perspective further. One 
elaborate and explicit grid or tool kit has been developed by the Centre de Sociologie des 
Organisations, taking advantage of the research program launched by its founder, Michel 
Crozier 7.   
An analytical agenda means that phenomena are not taken as a given but as a social construct, 
not as postulates but as hypothesis submitted to inquiry, as questions for research. 
Power is contextual. For instance it is not by definition linked to personality characteristics – 
age, social origin, charisma - or to formal positions in an institutional set up –being the CEO 
of a firm or the mayor of a city. Local circumstances make a difference. Authority as such 
does not imply power. A recurrent finding of organizational sociology is that, most of the 
time, both do not coincide along the hierarchy of authority. Power holders are not only the 
persons or the groups at the top. Contextual refers more precisely to the goals actors want to 
achieve, to the problems they address and would like to solve. Herbert Simon had suggested 
that preferences, goals, stakes, problems actors want to satisfy, achieve, manage or solve, are 
volatile. Their content and intensity vary according to the specific situation in which at a 
given moment the actor operates. They blend content – preferences, goals, problems or stakes 
- with context – how far the actor is dependent from the behaviors of other actors such as B or 
C to address them, that B’s or C’s behaviors are more or less unpredictable by A, that A may 
have to pay a cost in return for their cooperation.  
Power is relational. More precisely it is structured around and by interdependencies between 
actors. Heuristically speaking to state that A has power is poor analysis. Inquiry has to verify 
a few more information empirically. Over whom does A have power and over whom less or 
not, when and how far? In return, this does not mean that B and C are by definition powerless. 
Asymmetries are a question subject to verification. A more heuristic approach aims at 
verifying the cards as they are distributed and handled inside a web of interdependencies and 
interactions at work, between A and B, A and C and C and B. A may have more power over B 
or C than B has over A or C. 
Power is enacted via behaviors. A may control some uncertainties B’s stakes may depend 
from. But to exert his power on B, A has to behave in a certain manner, which is 
discretionary. Being transparent, therefore predictable by B, A loses his power capacity. In a 
way power games come close to poker games. Those that control winning cards have to play 
them to win, and they do it most of the time. And those who have the losing cards in their 
hands lose whenever they play with A.  
Mutual but unbalanced dependence relationships are quite common. Though deprived of any 
resource in his relationship with the master who exerts full and global control over the life of 
                                                
5 March J.G. « The Business Firm as a Political Coalition », Journal of Politics, 24, 662-678. 
6 Dahl R. 1957. « The Concept of Power », Behavioural Science, 2, 18 : 201-15 
7 Crozier M. 1963. The Bureaucratic Phenomenon. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
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his slave, this latter controls one uncertainty the master is dependent from: his own life. 
Suicide or death may be a tragic resource for the slave, but his master faces it as a constraint 
or a limit to his power, force or domination. Without slaves a master no longer remains a 
master if his stake is to be a master. And formal control systems dictated by the hierarchy 
about how to behave are reinterpreted by those who have to implement them giving birth to 
local arrangements that are considered as legitimate by those who apply them and are 
tolerated by those at the top who have the formal authority to write them. Therefore power 
explains or is a key factor explaining actual daily behaviors. What are the key stakes actor A 
wants to satisfy, from what kind of resources controlled by third parties is A dependent from 
to satisfy his stakes, what kind of constraints does A control that these third parties are 
dependent from to satisfy their own stakes, are key factors that shape the actual behaviors 
occurring between A and such or such third party, and determine the conditions of exchange 
and the limits not to violate in their relationships. 
Such a framework is heuristically fruitful because it pushes the analyst to study actual 
behaviors, acts and non-acts, decisions. To understand the real functioning of an organization 
at the level of specific actors as well as at the level of the organization as such requires 
specific techniques of in-depth interviewing, and, whenever it is possible, of shadowing. 
Attitude and opinion based questionnaires may provide raw materials. Nevertheless they have 
to be interpreted by the analyst. Interpretation means in this case that their content has to be 
referred to actual behaviors in interdependence relationships, for instance how an actor 
handles such contexts he may face or be part of. Tools such as sociograms – characterizing 
the feelings and judgments each actor expresses about other actors of the actions set - and 
behavioral grids – defining for each actor his stakes, resources, constraints, and behaviors in 
his relationship with other actors of the action set - help identify the usually latent stakes an 
actor tries to satisfice – avoiding being exposed to third party discretionary intervention, etc 
etc. Hypotheses about such behaviors and stakes should be considered as intermediary steps 
to identify power coalitions at the local as well as at the top level, who are their members, 
around what arrangements these coalitions are built and what their limits are, and why other 
groups are dependent from them8.  
Power games and political dynamics provide heuristic added value as far as they open up 
organizations as black boxes. They allow the analyst not to be blinded by a narrow top down 
approach, and not to overestimate the importance of the formal design of an institution. 
Heuristics means in the case of power that it provides a procedure robust enough to check 
how far the design or the hierarchy of authority really shape the actual functioning and 
decision making processes. They also help identifying the latent norms and the implicit 
coalitions of vested interests around specific issues. To say it bluntly, though not an end by 
itself, such a heuristic paves the ground for further inquiry about collective action in 
organized settings, even if power as such is not the problem a researcher wants to explore, 
solve or explain at the end. Any organization is subject to power phenomena. Political 
dynamics are not pathological symptoms. They are key vectors for achieving compatibility. 
According to the consequences such power games generate for the organization, its missions, 
its members, its stakeholders, analysis shall determine whether the social production of 
compatibility is or not dysfunctional and of a pathological nature. 
Such a heuristics can be applied to approach and explore other social configurations than just 
formal organizations. Whenever two or more formal organizations become interdependent 
                                                
8  Crozier M. and E. Friedberg. 1980. Actors and Systems : The Politics of Collective Action. University of 
Chicago Press. Chicago. 
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around a common task, problem or policy, whether they are linked by formal ties or because 
each of them in a way that is specific to it is a stakeholder or is part of a common action set, 
power dynamics occur and compatibility is at stake. Organizing and organized are processes 
at work well beyond the world of institutionalized organizations.  One relevant contribution 
for methodological purposes I made early on in my career was tested by a study of cross-
regulation processes linking through mutual action interdependence French mayors and local 
elected officers to State representatives heading local agencies of the national ministries9  
3. Heuristics yes, theory no! 
Power as a tool kit is fruitful not only to study formal organizations such as business firms 
and public administration agencies, but also to improve knowledge about other social objects 
and economic configurations.   
Policy analysis studies from a political science or sociology perspective have underlined that 
in more that 70% of the cases a policy fails to generate the impacts policy-makers had in mind 
when designing the policy. What happens during the implementation stage is not in line with 
what formally the policy was to achieve. Implementation has to be considered as a specific 
political and social arena where, when applying the formal rules, instruments and instructions,  
those in charge of it tend to set up standards and to adopt behaviors that are different, given 
the specificities of the local contexts they are in charge of. Implementation gives birth to local 
power arenas including those who execute but also outside stakeholders.  Specific impacts, 
some not intended and others expressing resistances are generated not because the parties 
involved in implementation processes are dumb, lazy or corrupted, but because of pragmatic 
purposes or of vested interests that have no direct relation with the policy itself. Those who 
implement locally set up compromises and arrangements that do not jeopardize their own 
local stakes, that are also to some extent acceptable by local constituents and that policy-
makers at the top may tolerate. Quite common illustrations are linked to the way street 
bureaucrats such as police forces apprpriate crime and law policies and regulations dealing  
with  road freight transportation10. Such a phenomenon is quite identical to what has been 
observed in industrial plants where workers and foremen, when not their local managers, 
enforce work instructions designed by the headquarters. It has been defined by Jean-Daniel 
Reynaud as conjunct social regulation, the people at the local level inventing autonomous 
rules or informal norms that are not the same than the control rules imposed by the top11 
Heuristics and tool kits are not or should not be substitutes for the absence of specific 
theoretical agendas. To refer to power dynamics and structures as an analytical entry scheme 
or as an intermediary methodology, does not imply that the agenda of a study deals by 
definition with collective action. Power is a means, not an end. Otherwise power as heuristics 
may be a substitute for a theoretical framework entering through the back door more or less in 
a clandestine manner. For the concept of power carries by itself some specific theoretical 
postulates or assumptions. 
One major postulate is about behaviors in interdependence local contexts. Individuals and 
groups are considered as strategic actors. Vested and particularistic interests drive them.  Here 
                                                
9 Crozier M . and J.C. Thoenig. 1976. « The Regulation of Complex Organized Systems », A) Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 21,4: 547-570  
10 Dupuy F. and J.C. Thoenig. 1979. « Public Transportation Policy Making in France as an Implementation 
Problem », Policy Science, 11, 1: 1-18 
11 Reynaud J.D. 1997. Les règles du jeu : l’action collective et la régulation sociale. Armand Colin, Paris. 
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the danger lies in the fact that an analyst may forget about other factors that shape behaviors 
and that are exogenous to the relationships studied such as culture, ideologies, social 
stratification, just to name a few. 
Another set of postulates is that power games tend to give a premium to a Weltanschaung that 
defines organizations or polities as being polyarchic or pluralistic by definition. Here the 
danger may lie in the fact that the analyst underestimates the existence of domination macro-
structures or games of the game that are for instance oligarchic regimes and cultural 
domination vectors – as illustrated for the capitalist regime of the first third of 1900s by 
Antonio Gramsci and his theory of hegemony12.   
In other words, methodologies as ends, heuristics forgetting about their underlying theoretic 
postulates, pave the way for two dangers or scientific abuses.  
A first danger is that they are used as hammers looking for nails. The confusion made 
between methodology and theory opens the door to the illusion that anything can be analyzed 
and explained in a relevant manner though power lenses. The fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness means that any empirical phenomenon could be studied without questioning the 
relevance of their theoretical postulates for the problem under inquiry. This critique makes 
sense for strategic neo-behavioral approaches, local power dynamics being disconnected from 
broader structural factors and evolutions of societies, economies and polities. Local orders 
explain it all. Institutions do not matter much. And no global or exogenous factors are 
considered.  
A second danger is that any social context and collective construction could be basically 
considered as understandable mainly as an power arena, and not much more, as if power 
would be in a way the ultimate key to social order and action.  Such a deviation could be 
apply to approaches inspired by a biased understanding of class struggle paradigms or 
postulating that one hidden hand, center, elite or ideology manipulates and has full control of 
the periphery of an organization or of society. Why bother about local orders? 
Epistemological over-simplification is a kind of infantile disease still at work today. 
Academic scholars having not benefited from a solid education to the basics of sociology and 
political science, as it is the case sometimes for business schools faculty, ignore the lessons as 
well as the analytical trades of former generations of scholars. They are prone to follow the 
latest intellectual fads. An exclusive reference to quantitative measurement and statistical data 
banks in some cases, the accumulation of fishing expeditions, meaning research without 
theoretical frameworks and without fruitful heuristics, for others, are two common sins among 
their ranks.  
One of the least desirable consequences has to do with the disconnection between global and 
local, between macro and micro, as if social action and order would be a struggle between two 
extremes. Organizations and organized set ups as meso levels or action arenas or are 
underestimated as having their own dynamics. For instance institutional theories of all kinds 
are misunderstood when they become substitutes for hyper-deterministic paradigms. Or 
network analysis ignoring its intrinsic limits to explain collective action and order, becomes a 
hammer looking for nails of any kind. Societies, polities and economies are assumed to be 
linear and simple constructs, as if observing what happens at the top would suffice to 
                                                
12 Gramsci A.1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. International Publishers 
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understand what happens at the bottom or, vice-versa, what happens at the micro-level may 
give the key to understand in a relevant manner what happens at the macro-level. The 
hypothesis of meso-order and action arenas, therefore of discontinuities, is discarded or 
perceived as not worth considering. Discontinuities, variations at the intermediary levels are 
just exceptions to an iron law: at the end of the day what matters is either what is global and 
macro, or the global is nothing else than an addition or combination of micro or very local set 
ups and dynamics. Power as heuristics gives a better chance to consider at the same time an 
action and order system as driven by endogenous dynamics and as determined by exogenous 
forces.    
Using power analysis as a heuristic tool does not imply that no other tool kits have to be 
discarded. Other methodologies are needed according to the problem to be studied. More 
important, power analysis is compatible with theoretical agendas that are not linked to power 
theory. To give just one example, I have recently studied firms, their functioning, their 
government and their policy-making processes from a cognitive perspective. How the various 
actors involved at the level of the business units and in the executive suites build and mobilize 
implicit knowledge and interpretation schemes for action taking was my theoretical agenda. 
Actors, whether single or collective, are not mere power players, which means mere cultural 
idiots. They also think, interpret, theorize and believe. How do they create compatibility by 
sharing cognitions is a key to clarify by research. Specific methodologies were required for 
that purpose. Nevertheless power heuristics helped a lot to make sense of how cognitions 
circulate, evolve or not, and are or not made compatible between actors13.  
4. Scientific enigmas about power as a problem for knowledge 
Is the agenda about power nowadays of declining return in terms of knowledge? No, much is 
still to be explored.  
Social scientists sometime define as “emergent” or “new” facets of power that are not new or 
emergent from a historic perspective, but that they had not yet studied. Marketing is part of 
their trade.  Not enough importance is usually given to forms of power, hegemony, 
domination and resistance that are declining or disappearing in societies, polities and 
economies. Zones of ignorance are still numerous and provide research niches for several 
years to many social scientists. What kind of problems, topics or issues would attract my own 
curiosity if I were to study power in the coming years? 
• Which consequences shall the current evolutions of the academic institutions, its 
emphasis on standardization of performance and excellence, its growing reference to 
quasi-market mechanisms of management and competition, have now that the 
importance of academic professions seems to plateau, that state steering is 
transforming, and that organizational rationales get more and more importance at the 
level of single universities? 
• Is it true or not that the social elites in business and in politics have seen their forms, 
resources and positions of power and authority modified since globalization had 
experienced a extraordinary acceleration?  
• Do old forms of cultural hegemony inside work organizations really decline, and do 
new forms have a growing influence, how, how far, and with which implications? 
                                                
13 See Michaud and Thoenig, above. 
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